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This paper describes a model of how musicians make decisions about performing notated
music. The model builds on psychological theories of decision-making and was developed
from empirical studies of Western art music performance that aimed to identify intuitive
and deliberate processes of decision-making, a distinction consistent with dual-process
theories of cognition. The model proposes that the proportion of intuitive (Type 1) and
deliberate (Type 2) decision-making processes changes with increasing expertise and
conceptualizes this change asmovement along a continually narrowing upward spiral where
the primary axis signiﬁes principal decision-making type and the vertical axis marks level
of expertise. The model is intended to have implications for the development of expertise
as described in two main phases.The ﬁrst is movement from a primarily intuitive approach
in the early stages of learning toward greater deliberation as analytical techniques are
applied during practice.The second phase occurs as deliberate decisions gradually become
automatic (procedural), increasing the role of intuitive processes. As a performer examines
more issues or reconsiders decisions, the spiral motion toward the deliberate side and
back to the intuitive is repeated indeﬁnitely. With increasing expertise, the spiral tightens
to signify greater control over decision type selection.Themodel draws on existing theories,
particularly Evans’ (2011) InterventionModel of dual-process theories, Cognitive Continuum
Theory Hammond et al. (1987), Hammond (2007), Baylor’s (2001) U-shaped model for the
development of intuition by level of expertise. By theorizing how musical decision-making
operates over time and with increasing expertise, this model could be used as a framework
for future research in music performance studies and performance science more generally.
Keywords: music performance, decision-making, intuitive, deliberate, expertise, dual-process theories, default-
interventionist
INTRODUCTION
In performance studies, the topic of decision-making is cru-
cial to understanding how practitioners create and interpret. For
example, to perform notated music, musicians make many deci-
sions about stylistic and expressive nuances that may or may
not be notated and are likely to vary between performers and
performances. This paper seeks to understand and model how
performers decide to create such nuances by considering one
possible distinction between types of decision-making, namely
the difference between intuitive and deliberate decision-making
process.
These two types of decisions are deﬁned using a theoretical
framework from dual-process theories of cognition. These theo-
ries contrast System1 and 2 (e.g., Kahneman,2011) orType 1 and 2
thinking (e.g., Evans, 2011; Stanovich, 2011; Evans and Stanovich,
2013); processes we refer to as intuition and deliberation. Evans
(2011) has deﬁned the former (Type 1) as“fast, high capacity, inde-
pendent of working memory and cognitive ability” and the latter
(Type 2) as “slow, low capacity, heavily dependent on working
memory and related to individual differences in cognitive ability”
(p. 87). The decisions discussed in this paper relate to music per-
formance and are deﬁned as changes to performance features that
are reported or observed using empirical methods. In addition,
our focus is the processes of decision-making, rather than their
results such as decision accuracy or content. Therefore, the model
introduced in this paper refers to how changes are made to per-
formance features and whether these processes exemplify Type 1
or Type 2 thinking.
Some research has already shed light on how both intuition and
deliberation are used bymusicians. For example,Hallam (1995a,b)
interviewed twenty-twoperformers about their practice habits and
found differences between those who were “intuitive/serialists”
versus “analytic/holists.” Seven musicians preferred the intuitive
approach, allowing their interpretation to evolve unconsciously
and avoiding deliberate analysis and planning. Two musicians
were classed as analytic and relied on deliberate, conscious anal-
ysis of the piece. Ten musicians used a mixed, “versatile” strategy,
adopting the two approaches interchangeably and three musi-
cians remained unclassiﬁed. Overall, Hallam (1995a) found that
professional performers “have a tendency to prefer versatile or
intuitive/serialist styles of learning” (p. 121).
This paper aims to provide a context for such results by consid-
ering the interaction between intuition and deliberation and how
their use might change. Hallam’s study implies that many musi-
cians shift between strategies, but what causes such movement and
could it bemodeled? This paper introduces a spiralmodel of musi-
cal decision-making by summarizing relevant existing models and
drawing on recent empirical research about the performance of
Western art music. We will argue that our model incorporates
the long and short-term development of decision-making and
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expertise along the intuitive-deliberate continuum that is largely
absent from current literature.
EXISTING MODELS
A number of existing models have attempted to address the rela-
tionship between intuition and deliberation. We use these as a
starting point for understanding how intuitive and deliberate pro-
cesses of decision-making operate over time. The models share
a number of principles, including: (a) decision-making processes
change over time and with increasing expertise; (b) both intu-
itive and deliberate processes can be employed, but intuition
occurs before deliberation; and (c) the nature and content of intu-
itions can change (future intuitions are informed by analytical
thinking).
THE INTERVENTION MODEL
Among dual-process theories, a common view of the interac-
tion between Type 1 and Type 2 processes are models known
as default-interventionist. These models propose that Type 1
processes generate a default response and this response will be
given unless there is later intervention by Type 2 processes (e.g.,
Stanovich, 1999; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Evans, 2007).
The Intervention Model (Evans, 2011) is a “new general model of
intervention on default intuitive responses” (p. 95) that attempts
to give a more detailed account of factors that lead to the inter-
vention of Type 2 processes. Evans (2011) proposes that “Type 2
processing is engaged with a variable degree of effort” (p. 95) and
that motivational factors and cognitive resources inﬂuence the
degree of effort engaged. The motivational factors that inﬂuence
the intervention of Type 2 processes include a feeling of rightness
(FOR) that accompanies a Type 1 response (Thompson, 2009).
According to Thompson, the strength of the FOR determines the
probability and extent to which Type 2 processes are engaged to
analyze or rethink Type 1 decisions. While a weak FOR should
engage a Type 2 response and a strong FOR should retain a Type 1
response, individual differences in monitoring, control and think-
ing disposition are just some factors that may alter these predicted
outcomes. Mangan (1993) has previously suggested that strong
feelings of rightness are central to esthetic experience:
Esthetic phenomenology appears to have at its core an especially intense
experience of rightness. It is this feeling that gives esthetic experience
its phenomenological proﬁle: the sense of immediate correctness, of an
especially well-integrated or “right” relation of parts, of a primary and
metaphysical YES! of cognitive disclosure (p. 97).
According to the Intervention Model (Evans, 2011), if Type 2
processing is engaged, the initial intuitiveAnswer 1 (A1) will either
be deliberately justiﬁed or not. If A1 is not justiﬁed, an attemptwill
be made to rethink the problem and lead to Answer 2 (A2). Evans
points out that A1 may actually be the same as A2 and such cases
reﬂect confabulations or justiﬁcations for the initial intuition. The
attempt to rethink the problem may fail if it is constrained by
cognitive resources, resulting in a reversion to the initial A1, a
random guess, or no answer altogether.
COGNITIVE CONTINUUM THEORY
A different explanation is the spectrum of cognition known as
Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) proposed by Hammond
et al. (1987). According to CCT, “the mode of cognition used
on any type of judgment, decision-making, or problem solving
task can vary on a continuum ranging from intuition to analysis”
(Hamm, 1988, p. 758). Intuitive processing is deﬁned as low cog-
nitive control, rapid data processing and low conscious awareness,
while analytical processing involves high cognitive control, slow
data processing and high conscious awareness (Hammond et al.,
1987). Hammond (2007) has acknowledged that the concept of
a cognitive continuum is an abstraction; “no one has ever seen
such a continuum and, of course, no one ever will” (p. 125–126).
He has also explained how cognitive activity can oscillate between
intuition and analysis:
In short, the tactics most of us use most of the time are neither fully
intuitive nor fully analytical: they are a compromise that contains some
of each; how much of each depends on the nature of task and on the
knowledge the person making the judgment brings to the task. And
over time, the person will move his or her cognitive activity across the
cognitive continuum (p. 237).
As well as the notion of a cognitive continuum, Hammond
(2007) has outlined a task continuum and a surface-depth contin-
uum that help to contextualize and explain intuition and analysis.
The surface-depth continuum refers to data that are close to the
personmaking the judgments (surface) and data about objects and
events that are remote in time or place from that person (depth).
The task continuum differentiates judgment tasks according to
whether they are intuition-inducing or analysis-inducing, with
common sense-inducing falling between the twopoles. Hammond
suggests researchers list properties of a task, locate it on the task
continuum, and predict the nature of the judgment that the task
induces. This procedure was followed in a study of highway engi-
neers inwhich judgments and taskswere assessedusing aCognitive
ContinuumIndex (CCI) andTaskContinuumIndex (TCI) respec-
tively (Hammond et al., 1997). The study required judgments of
highway esthetics (intuition-inducing), safety (quasirationality-
inducing) and capacity (analysis-inducing), and found better per-
formance when the mode of cognition used (CCI) corresponded
to the task properties (TCI).
An earlier study of highway engineers by Hamm (1988) also
required judgments of highway esthetics, safety, and capacity, but
demonstrated the dynamic nature of the cognitive continuum by
mapping analytic and intuitive cognitive activity over time using
a Moment by Moment Cognitive Continuum Index (MBMCCI).
Hamm suggested ﬁve possible ways in which cognitive activity
may change: a linear progression from intuitive to analytic think-
ing or vice versa, non-linear alternation between intuition and
analysis or vice versa, and rapid repeated alternation between
intuition and analysis. The study found no evidence for linear
trends, but there was evidence of alternation between intuition (I)
and analysis (A), either in a curve moving from intuition to ana-
lytic to intuition (I-A-I) or from analytic to intuition to analytic
(A-I-A).
U-SHAPED DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRESSION OF INTUITIVE THINKING
Baylor (2001) has proposed that intuition matures with increas-
ing levels of expertise in a U-shaped manner. According to this
model, intuitive processes are frequently employed by novices
with less-developed knowledge structures and by experts with
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highly developed knowledge structures. The use of deliberation
and metacognitive strategies in becoming an expert develops a
type of intuition Baylor labels “mature intuition.” In contrast, the
intuitions of a novice are qualitatively different and can be consid-
ered “immature intuition.” This creates a U-shaped progression
of intuitive thinking where the availability of immature intu-
ition is high for a novice, decreases during an intermediate stage,
and then climbs to high availability of mature intuition for an
expert.
Baylor (2001) states that “the “available intuition” within a
given subject area refers to the potentiality for intuitive think-
ing to exist at a given point in development of an individual’s
level of expertise” (p. 239). In the ﬁrst half of the curve, an intu-
itive understanding in the form of immature intuition moves to
a more analytical and less intuitional understanding. In support
of this shift, Baylor cites various empirical studies, including work
by Bamberger (1982) on musical intelligence showing that chil-
dren appear to lose a ﬁgural grasp of phrases when they ﬁrst
develop a formal understanding of musical notation. With fur-
ther development, both components become reﬁned and are used
interactively by accomplished musicians. Baylor interprets this
ﬁnding as an immature understanding moving to an intermedi-
ate stage and then progressing to maturity. The intermediate stage
is similar to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) characterization of the
“proﬁcient performer” as a person who intuitively organizes and
understands their task, but still ﬁnds themselves “thinking analyt-
ically about what to do” (p. 29). The “proﬁcient performer” is the
mid-point in their inﬂuential ﬁve-stage model of skill acquisition,
consisting of novice, competent, proﬁcient, expert, and master
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1980).
In the second half of Baylor’s curve, a person may relin-
quish some metacognitive control over reasoning and access more
mature intuition based on new knowledge structures. A mature
type of intuition is also implied in the work of Hogarth (2001),
who suggests that intuition can be educated by learning from
experience anddeveloping skills throughobservation, speculation,
testing, and generalization (p. 214–247).
Having brieﬂy summarized various theories relevant to the dis-
tinction betweenType 1 andType 2 decision-making processes, we
will now consider recent empirical studies of music performance
to determine how existing models apply to musicians.
INTUITIVE AND DELIBERATE MUSICAL DECISION-MAKING
Research related to processes of musical decision-making includes
the work of Hallam (1995a,b) on different styles of practice
discussed earlier and studies by Chafﬁn in collaboration with
performers such as Imreh, Ginsborg, and Lisboa (e.g., Chaf-
ﬁn et al., 2002; Chafﬁn and Lisboa, 2009; Ginsborg and Chafﬁn,
2011). Chafﬁn’s research has shown that while performing, musi-
cians pay deliberate attention to certain speciﬁc musical aspects
(performance cues) and also have spontaneous performance
thoughts. This section will discuss further developments in this
area of investigation by summarizing the results of two recent
studies of professional musicians who perform on period instru-
ments (Bangert et al., 2014, under review). The ﬁrst study used
experimental methods and the second took the form of a case
study.
Our study of seven violinists sight-reading, practicing and
performing an unfamiliar piece of solo Baroque music iden-
tiﬁed various types of decisions being made (Bangert et al.,
under review). The study involved tasks that were intuition-
inducing (sight-reading) and analysis-inducing (thinking-aloud
during practice) in order to compare the proportion of deci-
sion types in a ﬁnal task of performing the piece. This design
was informed by default-interventionist models of dual-process
theories: sight-reading was judged to be a wholly intuitive task
requiring rapid default responses to issues raised in the piece, while
practice thoughtswere captured through a concurrent think-aloud
and asking participants tomark the score. Changes to performance
features in the sight-read and performance data were analyzed,
annotated, and then compared with practice data (a method-
ology piloted in Bangert et al., 2009). This process resulted in
decisions in the ﬁnal performance task being categorized as intu-
itive (not planned) or deliberate (planned). The study found a
high percentage of intuitive decision-making, with approximately
82% of decisions made during performance categorized as intu-
itive. The seven participants were divided into three levels of
expertise and important differences were found between these
groups. Firstly, more experienced performers made a signiﬁcantly
greater number of decisions compared to less experienced per-
formers. Secondly, the most experienced group made a greater
proportion of deliberate decisions compared to less experienced
groups.
While the study of violinists provided insights into how musi-
cians make decisions in the early stages of learning a new piece,
we have also examined how decisions are made when the per-
former is familiar with the musical material. In a case study of
the cellist Daniel Yeadon, we were able to elicit detailed descrip-
tion of decision-making regarding his interpretation of J. S.
Bach’s Suites for Solo Cello, BWV1007-1012 (Bangert et al., 2014).
Decisions were deﬁned as reported changes to one or more per-
formance features and were classiﬁed according to the language
used within the quotation (a methodology piloted in Bangert,
2009). Four categories of decisions were found: intuitive, pro-
cedural, deliberate, and deliberate HIP (historically informed
performance).
Decisions categorized as deliberate (including deliberate HIP)
accounted for 65% of the total number of decisions found,
while intuitive (including procedural) decisions accounted for the
remaining 35%. Intuitive decisions were based on a feeling or
sense and were not explained further. In these quotations Yeadon
described doing things based on “how I’m feeling at the time” (p.
41) or being“experimental” and“spontaneous” (p. 42). Deliberate
decisions demonstrated conscious awareness and planning. These
quotations included phrases like “I had it in my head” (p. 46) or
“I’d consciously decided”(p. 47). Since the case studywas of period
instrument performance (Baroque cello), the category of deliber-
ate HIP was used to highlight decisions clearly based on Yeadon’s
knowledge of musical style and performing practices during the
Baroque period.
An important ﬁnding from the study was the novel category of
procedural decisions, a sub-set of intuitive decisions that were
originally deliberate but had become automatic and “built-in”
through practice over time (p. 44). The processes involved in
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this category resemble the concept of mature intuition proposed
by Baylor (2001). For example, when discussing articulation in
a certain passage, Yeadon stated, “It felt natural to me. As if I’d
assimilated all the stuff I had been thinking about all those bars
and I was just playing” (p. 45). Yeadon also talked about how the
process of assimilation or automatization is necessary to achieve a
ﬂow state (deﬁnedbyCsíkszentmihályi, 1975,1988) during perfor-
mance: “I’ve thought about what I want in each bar but when I’m
actually playing I don’t really have time to nourish those thoughts
and put them into practice” (p. 45). Another performer who has
alluded to this process is harpsichordist Gustav Leonhardt (as cited
in Sherman, 1997):
When one is a student one does things consciously, but when one
is more experienced one does not play intellectually any more. One
doesn’t think; one has thought. You must have done so before, but when
you perform it is too late to think; you are only making music, without
any thought of “now delay here” and “now articulate there” (p. 198).
In our case study, Yeadon also discussed differences between
novice and expert thinking, but implied a circular motion begin-
ning with early intuitive responses followed by a period of analysis
and ﬁnally the use of intuitive/procedural decisions while “in the
zone”:
How do you think your goals for these pieces [J. S. Bach’s Suites for Solo
Cello] have shifted over time?
I think I’ve probably come a full circle. I think when I ﬁrst played them
as a kid I found it easier. . . I always related to the music, so I found it
easier just to play them in a really instinctive way. It was just music that
spoke to me and I felt that I could interpret them and be myself. Then
I started studying early music and doing lots of reading of treatises,
reading about how music was played at the time and what one should
and shouldn’t do. It’s become a much more mental process and I’ve
passed through that lens and done a lot of mental work - not on all
of the suites but on some of the movements and some of the suites.
In a way that’s been, the mental aspect of it, has been quite painful
because it’s meant that I’ve been more self-conscious in the way I play
it. I’ve been more aware of other people’s interpretations, aware of the
greatness of the music. Now I’m coming back to being able to, as I was
saying before, being in the zone and just making the music purely my
own and heartfelt and not letting the mental stuff get in the way.
The mental work that you’ve done, do you mean performance practice
research or. . .?
Yes, and then just thinkingmore carefully about theminutiae of playing,
about the articulation, slurrings, dynamics, overall phrasing arches,
architecture.
The quotations by Leonhardt and Yeadon both stress the
use of unconscious processes in expert performance, suggesting
that experienced musicians rely on intuitions informed by con-
scious study and what Yeadon termed “mental work.” In addition,
Yeadon’s description of coming“full circle” in how he makes musi-
cal decisions provides a context for the results of the case study
documented in Bangert et al. (2014). While it may feel like coming
“full circle” for Yeadon in that he is relying more on intuitive pro-
cesses again, the quality of his intuitions has presumably changed
in line with his increased knowledge and expertise (the result of
studying, reading, and “mental work”). Using Baylor’s (2001) ter-
minology, his processes of decision-making are now guided by
mature intuition (procedural) rather than the immature intuitions
of a novice.
A SPIRAL MODEL OF MUSICAL DECISION-MAKING
When incorporated with the existing theories of Evans (2011),
Hammond (2007), Baylor (2001), our studies of musical decision-
making raise new possibilities for modeling the role of intuition
and deliberation. The review of various models related to cogni-
tive processes, decision-making and expertise demonstrates that
an individual moves through points of using more or less intu-
ition and deliberation according to circumstances and experience.
However, some recent research brieﬂy summarized above sug-
gests that a more comprehensive account could be developed.
In particular, current models generally propose a simple move-
ment between poles and lack representation of the unfolding
process involved in the development of musical expertise and
decision-making.
Our proposal is that the dimension of expertise development
can be integrated in a new model, illustrated in Figure 1 as a
conical helix that alternates between points of more intuitive/less
deliberate and more deliberate/less intuitive decision-making pro-
cesses. As the upward-spiraling motion is a key characteristic
of the model, we use the term spiral model in this paper to
refer to the conical helix and its axes. The model that we pro-
pose extends Baylor’s (2001) U-shaped curve by acknowledging
that the process of learning is a dynamic and continuous one
in which a performer returns to musical problems over their
lifespan with a ﬂuctuating emphasis on either intuition or delib-
eration. The spiral shape and the process of action and reaction
it implies has also been inﬂuenced by a similar spiral model pro-
posed by Fabian (2003) to account for the history of expressiveness
in twentieth-century music performance as evidenced on sound
recordings.
The x-axis in Figure 1 represents the proportion of decision-
making processes, contrasting more intuitive (Type 1) with more
deliberate (Type 2). The spiral starts from a point on the x-
axis representing a primarily intuitive approach and alternates
between phases of greater use of either deliberation (“becoming
conscious”) or intuition (“becoming automatic”). It is important
to recognize that any point along the spiral represents the use of
a greater or lesser proportion of intuition or deliberation, not
a sole reliance on one or the other. In other words, the x-axis
in Figure 1 is an intuitive-deliberate continuum that does not
exclude contribution from either process. This acknowledges that
most tasks require a mixture of Type 1 and Type 2 processes (also
see Hammond’s concept of “quasirationality,” Hammond, 1996,
2010).
The spiral moves gradually upward along the vertical y-axis
in Figure 1 representing level of expertise. Based on a deﬁnition
by Ericsson et al. (2007), Papageorgi et al. (2010) suggest that an
expert musician is“a person who consistently demonstrates excep-
tional levels of performance compared to other individuals of
similar age and experience andwhose level of expertise can be con-
ﬁrmed by some form of measurable outcomes” (p. 32). Attitudes
about the nature of musical expertise vary, but expert musicians
are generally understood to excel across a range of musical skills
such as the ability to communicate musically to an audience, prac-
tice efﬁciently, display technical proﬁciency, and so on (Creech
et al., 2008). In this paper, we focus on one component of musical
expertise, namely the ability to make informed decisions about
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FIGURE 1 | Spiral model of musical decision-making.
performing a piece of music. Level of musical expertise has been
shown to strongly relate to amounts of deliberate practice (Eric-
sson et al., 1993; Sloboda et al., 1996), but this is not the only
factor in achieving high levels of musical proﬁciency (Willia-
mon and Valentine, 2000; Hallam, 2001a; Hallam and Bautista,
2012).
The intuitive side of the spiral in Figure 1 includes a transi-
tion toward more procedural decision-making processes signiﬁed
by an upward arrow, meaning that a performer who has passed
through several phases in the spiral can access procedural skills and
knowledge (mature intuition). As expertise increases and more
deliberate decisions become automatic, reliance on procedural
processes becomes greater.
The radius of the spiral (r) in Figure 1 is labeled type selec-
tion degree of chance, which is greatest at the base entry point
and decreases incrementally as the spiral proceeds. Chance in this
model is deﬁned in opposition to control, which may be implicit
or explicit (Blais, 2010). Therefore, the decreasing radius indicates
that the selection of decision-making processes is more arbitrary
and subject to chance in novices and that experts have greater con-
trol and consistency in how decisions are made. The tightening of
the spiral in Figure 1 also implies that the rate of changing pro-
portions in decision-making processes becomes more rapid and
relatively effortless with increasing expertise.
As the data that informs the spiral model concerns musicians
engagingwith a speciﬁc piece, themodel is primarily conceived as a
depiction of musical decision-making by an individual performer
in relation to a piece over their lifespan. However, the application
of the model has been purposely left somewhat open-ended. We
are open to its use to explain decision-making in relation to any
repertoire, either as deﬁned in the singular or grouped by com-
poser, style, genre, or another classiﬁer. The time-span involved
may also vary and the model could have relevance beyond the
musical domain as a general theory of decision-making. In this
paper we refer to pieces or repertoire rather than works or compo-
sitions as the latter terms connote greater permanency (following
Leech-Wilkinson, 2012).
To take into account individual differences, we propose that
the spiral in Figure 1 need not be in a central position and could
shift to any point along the x-axis. Therefore, Figure 1 is a gener-
alized spiral model of musical decision-making that can be varied
and adapted. For example, the radius joins the y-axis in Figure 1
due to the centralized spiral, but spirals for different perform-
ers or different repertoire are likely to have a curved or slanting
vertical axis that is independent of the y-axis and determines
radius.
We consider the spiral model to be a visual representation
that can explain behavior and make certain predictions, but it is
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principally metaphorical in nature and not strictly mathematical
(Gentner and Grudin, 1985; Hoffman et al., 1990). While many
elements of the model could be depicted on a two-dimensional
plane, we have drawn it in three dimensions to give an inde-
pendent deﬁnition to changes in the radius and include the
spiraling motion that will be discussed in more detail later in
the paper. To further explain the model, we now describe a
typical path through various points in Figure 1 with reference
to pertinent literature from psychology and music performance
studies.
MOVEMENT TOWARD GREATER DELIBERATION
Default-interventionist views of dual-process theories like Evans’
(2011) Intervention Model predict default responses to be intu-
itive. Following this theory, performers facedwith a new repertoire
or musical problem would employ primarily intuitive processes
of decision-making, conceptualized as a point at the far left of
the x-axis in Figure 1. In our study of violinists (Bangert et al.,
under review), the task of learning a new piece was shown to be
highly reliant on intuition, even after a 45 min practice session.
In both the sight-read and performance conditions, participants
drew on their feelings of “rightness” or “wrongness” and a sense
of what worked, what seemed natural, obvious, or appropriate
to guide their decision-making. However, there was movement
toward more deliberate processes of decision-making over time,
particularly by experienced players who brought key issues to con-
scious attention and provided solutions in a more rapid, efﬁcient
manner. This is perhaps to be expected since expert performers
tend to use the most efﬁcient practice strategies (Lehmann and
Jørgensen, 2012, p. 686). The difference between performers with
more experience and those with less can be conceptualized in the
spiral model as differences in the quality of intuitions (movement
toward more procedural) and the ability to control type selection
(decreasing radius).
Through analysis and deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993),
musicians gradually make more deliberate choices about their
interpretation,moving upward from the left of the x-axis to a point
on the right. This movement is labeled “becoming conscious”
in Figure 1. The move toward deliberate decision-making pro-
cesses is crucial to the ability to make informed musical decisions
and is achieved by experimenting with interpretative possibilities.
During practice, decisions are weighed up, reﬂected on, ana-
lyzed, and other options explored. Practice may be physical or
mental and the strategies for planning, conducting and evaluat-
ing practice can vary considerably between individual performers
(Jørgensen and Hallam, 2009). Performers may make various
deliberate decisions based on a multitude of inﬂuences, such as
the structure of the piece, technical challenges, knowledge of his-
torical information, and speciﬁc past experiences. Therefore, the
role of deliberation grows, but is subject to varying degrees of
critical effort (Evans, 2011) according to the individual, task and
context.
MOVEMENT TOWARD GREATER INTUITION
Deliberate decisions start to become automated through prac-
tice and increased familiarity with the repertoire and musical
issues being considered, moving up and back toward the intuitive
side (from right to left on the x-axis). This movement is labeled
“becoming automatic” in Figure 1.
The move from deliberation to intuition was implied in some
quotations from our study of violinists (Bangert et al., under
review), such as a reference to “built-in” stylistic understanding,
but was most clearly articulated through the category of pro-
cedural (after Squire, 1987) found in our case study of cellist
Daniel Yeadon (Bangert et al., 2014). This category was consid-
ered a subset of intuitive and consisted of deliberate decisions
that had become automatic over time as the result of practice
(described byYeadon as“built-in”or“assimilated”). The categories
of intuitive and procedural provide evidence for differences within
Type 1 processes like Pretz’s (2011) distinction between holistic
judgments that integrate complex information (termed classic or
holistic intuition) and judgments based on analytical processes
that have become automatic through practice (termed inferential
intuition).
In the spiral model, we incorporate these differences within
Type 1 processes through an upward arrow showing that per-
formers use more procedural decision-making processes (a subset
of intuitive) with increasing expertise. This is the result of the
semicircular movement of deliberate decisions becoming auto-
matic at each successive level of the spiral. Therefore, automaticity
is not equivalent to intuition, but is considered a characteristic
of procedural processes that gains more prominence as the spiral
proceeds.
The importance of procedural processes has been raised in
previous studies of music performance, including by pioneering
music psychologist Seashore (1919):
One must have been intensely conscious of technique, must have
known laws, must have isolated element after element for intensive
study, all severely intellectual, cold, and quite free from the artistic
impulse, before control of these can become so automatic as to drop
into the background of consciousness (p. 259).
More recently, Chafﬁn et al. (2002, p. 102–107) identiﬁed
a “gray” stage of practice in which the goal of the performer
is to develop automaticity. In their analysis, this stage forms
part of a second stage of practice within four main stages: (1)
Scouting it out; (2a) Section by section; (2b) The gray stage;
(3a) Putting it together; (3b) Polishing; (4) Maintenance (Chaf-
ﬁn et al., 2002, p. 101). Referring to expert period keyboard
performers, Berkowitz (2010) describes aspects of improvised
performance that are reliant on the internal ear, ﬁngers and experi-
ence: the performer has been“trained in the basicmusical building
blocks to such a degree of automatization/proceduralization that
these elements can be performed without conscious awareness”
(p. 124).
The process of proceduralization changes how a skill is exe-
cuted and the quality of intuitions more generally, resulting in the
“mature intuition” described by Baylor (2001). A similar phrase
from music performance studies is Rink’s (2002) “informed intu-
ition,” a concept “which recognizes the importance of intuition
in the interpretative process but also that considerable knowl-
edge and experience generally lie behind it” (p. 36; also see Rink,
1990). This point is made more generally by Hogarth (2001),
who notes that each person’s “inventory of intuitions” or “cul-
tural capital” which they use to interpret the world is continually
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and mainly implicitly shaped and informed by their experiences
(p. 9; also see Hogarth, 2008, p. 93–98). Experienced musicians
draw on a reliable and appropriate “inventory of intuitions” for
tasks or problems encountered within their domain of expertise
because they have accessed and integrated relevant information
and skills. In our model, “informed intuition” could simply
describe the intuitions of experts, while “mature intuition” as
explained by Baylor (2001) corresponds to our category of pro-
cedural (a subset of intuitive indicating deliberate decisions made
automatic).
SPIRAL MOTION
An upward spiral forms as previously deliberate decisions become
intuitive and other decisions need more deliberate attention. As
Moxley et al. (2012) have shown in their study of chess players,
both experts and those with less skill employ and greatly beneﬁt
from extra deliberation. Musicians deliberately explore and test
interpretative options, perhaps guided in their search by intuitive
pattern recognition. While one or a number of options may be
reinforced and made more automatic, the same decisions may be
reviewed, analyzed or reﬁned during a later phase in the spiral.
The types of decisions being made may move from basic or tech-
nical considerations to interpretative or expressive features of the
piece (Chafﬁn et al., 2002), although for performers with greater
expertise, these decisions are likely to be integrated to a greater
degree than with novices.
As the spiral proceeds, the radius gradually decreases to demon-
strate movement from a high degree of chance in type selection to
the performer having greater control. For instance, novice default
responses are likely to contain guesses and mistakes and what ini-
tially becomes subject to conscious attention may be somewhat
arbitrary and changeable. In contrast, experts apply and consol-
idate processes that are deemed appropriate and efﬁcient for the
task at hand. As Chi (2006) explains, “experts not only will know
which strategy or procedure is better for a situation, but they
also are more likely than novices to use strategies that have more
frequently proved to be effective” (p. 24). An expert musician
with high control over type selection may, for example, practice
a technical challenge to automaticity, plan the interpretation of
certain passages in detail, and intentionally leave another aspect
to spontaneity during performance. We use the term control as
not necessarily implying conscious awareness, but as a cognitive
process that may be implicit or explicit (Schmidt et al., 2007; Blais,
2010).
Decisions become progressively more informed and mature as
the result of the upward spiral motion until the performer is able
to rely on Type 1 decision-making processes that are procedural
in nature. At this stage, Type 2 decision-making processes may
be used in performance to direct attention to performance cues
(Chafﬁn et al., 2002), but much of the interpretation is “built-in.”
While some performersmay remain static at points in an individu-
alized spiral, there is no endpoint in the generalized spiral in order
to signify ongoing development of musical ideas, knowledge, and
understanding.
Performance can occur at any point in the model, but would
ideally take place when the spiral had moved upward and
tightened signiﬁcantly around the vertical axis. At this point,
decision-making is more informed and type selection more
controlled, allowing the performer to shape or direct their actions
to suit the speciﬁc aims and context of the performance. By per-
formance we mean a rendition of any kind (after Ridley, 2004,
p. 111; also see Cook, 2014). Emmerson (2009) suggests that the
decisions made during practice are essential, but in the end should
be “transcended” in performance:
In practice and rehearsal, one plays with all sorts of variations – some
obvious but many of them extremely subtle – and makes many con-
scious and unconscious decisions. But ultimately, most of these are in
fact transcended in the act of music-making. At some point one hands
the process over to the subconscious instincts to synthesize – to forge
all those details into a coherent form, inevitably one that is your own
(p. 117).
This quotation refers to various movements between intuition
and deliberation and suggests that performance relies on proce-
dural processes that “synthesize” decisions. Oscillation between
types of thinking is also described in CCT (Hammond et al., 1987;
Hammond, 2007). Like Hamm’s (1988) CCT-based study of high-
way engineers discussed earlier, our spiral model shows that the
emphasis placed on intuition or deliberation changes over time in
a non-linear way.
Other data reporting alternating periods of intuitive or delib-
erate thinking by musicians includes Holtz’s (2009) interview
study of 17 professional musicians in which almost all partici-
pants reported “the need for an alternation between phases of
deliberate construction and of intuitive experimentation”(p. 214).
Similarly, Nelson and Rawlings (2007) studied eleven artists (ﬁve
musicians, two writers, two visual artists, one writer/visual artist,
one playwright/theater director) and found that the artistic cre-
ative processes involved movement between intuition and more
critical, analytical mental processes that “may occur frequently
in the course of the overall process or only several times” (p.
239; also see Allen and Thomas, 2011; Sowden et al., 2014). They
explain that alternation between phases may occur for various
reasons:
The artist may be prompted to become more analytical in his approach
when he senses that the artwork is not “ﬂowing” as easily and therefore
loses conﬁdence in his approach to the work; when there is a sense of
elements of the artwork not“ﬁtting together”as well as theywere earlier
in the process; when he encounters a technical challenge, making him
contemplate how he will technically be able to convey certain ideas; or
when the focus of attention moves from the artwork to another mental
object (p. 235–236).
In a case study of a Western art music composer, Pohjannoro
(2014) found a core compositional procedure about “deepen-
ing and extending the awareness of the substance at hand” and
explained: “The procedure evolves through rapid back-and-forth
movements of different intuitive and reﬂective compositional
acts, monitored by metacognitive acts.” Drawing on dual-process
theories, intuitive (Type 1) compositional acts consisted of imag-
ination, experimentation, incubation and restructuring, reﬂective
(Type 2) acts comprised rule-based processing, contemplating
different alternatives and analytic viewing of the music, and
metacognitive acts incorporated evaluation, setting musical goals
(both Type 1/Type 2) and making operative plans (Type 2). In
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our spiral model, back-and-forth movement between Type 1 and
Type 2 decision-making processes by experts is similarly mediated
by a factor of control as the decreasing radius represents lessening
degrees of chance in type selection.
Moment to moment oscillation between modes of thinking can
occur at any time, but rapid movement by experts would corre-
spond to ahigher or theoretically ultimate point in the spiralmodel
(highest point of Figure 1). In the generalized spiral, the pro-
portion of decision-making processes appears balanced because
the musician has access to both intuition and deliberation and
can move between them with ease. Such an experience has been
described by songwriter and guitarist Richard Thompson (as cited
in Boyd, 1992):
You get inside the music to such an extent that you kind of are the
music, or the music’s you. You’re thinking about it but you’re not
thinking about it. Sometimes I think it’s almost a ﬂashing backward
and forward of intellect and intuition: One minute you’re thinking G
ﬂat, seven ﬁve, and then it’s gone and you’re doing something that
you’re not aware of really (p. 162).
This description suggests an additional dimension of ﬂow,
where the performer reaches a balance between their perceived
skill level and the perceived challenge and is totally absorbed
in the task (Csíkszentmihályi, 1975, 1988). Csíkszentmihályi’s
ﬂow construct consists of nine dimensions, which as well
as the skill-challenge balance and concentration on the task,
includes a strong sense of control (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990; Jack-
son and Csíkszentmihályi, 1999). In our model, an increase
in ﬂuidity and control in expert musical decision-making is
represented by the tightening of the spiral. A sense of con-
trol has been found to be important to ﬂow experiences of
musicians (Marin and Bhattacharya, 2013; Wrigley and Emmer-
son, 2013; Clark et al., 2014) and the relationship between this
ﬂow characteristic and musical decision-making warrants further
investigation.
In summary, the upward-spiraling motion in Figure 1 repre-
sents shifts in the proportion of intuitive and deliberate processes
of musical decision-making over time. Performers begin by relying
mainly on an immature intuition, but throughdeliberate processes
of decision-making during practice are able to automate conscious
choices, making them procedural. As performers become more
expert and move up the spiral, the radius decreases to signify grad-
ual reduction in the inﬂuence of chance and consequently, greater
control (implicit or explicit) over the selection of decision-making
processes appropriate for the task and performance context.
Eventually, the performer reaches a point at which their use
of intuition and deliberation to explore, understand, integrate
and apply musical possibilities has created an ideal performance
state in which the tension between the performer’s conscious and
unconscious is balanced from moment to moment (Sawyer, 2012,
p. 351).
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
While we have described the spiral model as a metaphorical
model, its key components nevertheless lead to several hypothe-
ses. These could be empirically tested in future research and can
be summarized as follows:
(1) Musicians ﬂuctuate in their processes of decision-making,
moving alternately between phases of greater or lesser intu-
ition and deliberation. These categories can be distinguished
through observed or reported data that demonstrate char-
acteristics of Type 1 or Type 2 thinking. Intuitive decision-
making processes are fast, effortless, based on a feeling or
sense, and generate default responses. Deliberate decision-
making processes are slow, effortful, demonstrate conscious
awareness and planning, and intervene on default responses.
(2) Novice and expert performers differ in the quality of their
intuitions, the speed of their movement between phases, and
their ability to control type selection. Novices access imma-
ture intuition, move more slowly between phases, and their
type selection are subject to high degrees of chance. Experts
can access mature intuition (procedural), move more quickly
between phases, and their type selection is more controlled
(implicitly or explicitly).
(3) Individualized spiral models can account for processes of
musical decision-making by different performers or the same
performer engaging with different repertoire. To construct
individualized models, factors such as task requirements and
individual differences shouldbe taken into account. For exam-
ple, an expert performer of a certain repertoire will have a
tighter spiral at the base in comparison to repertoire they are
not familiar with, and a performer with an intuitive cognitive
style or learning strategy will spiral more along the intu-
itive side in comparison to a performer who favors deliberate
strategies.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The spiral model proposed in this paper provides a context for
existing and future work in musical decision-making and perfor-
mance science more generally. For example, the high percentage
of intuitive decision-making (82%) in our study of Baroque vio-
linists (Bangert et al., under review) and relatively low percentage
of intuitive decision-making (35%) in our case study of cellist
Daniel Yeadon (Bangert et al., 2014) are both best explained in
the context of an ongoing, dynamic model of musical decision-
making. These overall results reﬂect the conditions of the task and
individual preferences at the time, but are likely to change as the
performer develops and reﬁnes their practice and performance
strategies.
By theorizing about changes to decision-making processes with
increasing expertise, including the maturing of intuition, the spi-
ral model supports the literature that makes distinctions within
Type 1 processes (e.g., Pretz, 2011) and extends existing mod-
els (e.g., Baylor, 2001). However, the model is limited by data
drawn from one type of music performance (notated Western art
music for solo period string instruments) and by constraints of
method that do not evidence the entire spiral from the novice
to expert. Therefore, the general theory of a spiral movement
could be tested by exploring elements that may be expected to
change with increasing expertise such as the focus or content
of musical decisions, the ability to articulate decisions, and the
changing nature of decisions on both the intuitive and deliberate
side of the spiral. Future research could also explore individual
variation according to the characteristics and demands of speciﬁc
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tasks. Expert intuition is domain-speciﬁc and changes to the
nature of the task such as the genre and style of music, com-
poser, or level of technical difﬁculty would affect how the spiral
proceeds over time. Therefore, the shape of the spiral and rate
of movement could depend on several factors, including indi-
vidual strategies and motivation, degree of existing familiarity
with the repertoire, task complexity, and overall level of performer
expertise.
Wehave addressed the issue of individual differences by propos-
ing that the spiral in Figure 1 may be placed anywhere along the
x-axis to illustrate variation in approaches between musicians.
Some performers may remain static at points on the spiral for
a period of time, veer toward the intuitive or deliberate side, or dip
in expertise. Thus, the general principle of a ﬂuctuating empha-
sis between intuition and deliberation can be applied individually
to varying degrees and lead to differing endpoints in a slanting
spiral shape that is not centrally located. For example, the 65%
of deliberate decisions found overall in our case study of cellist
Daniel Yeadon (Bangert et al., 2014) would suggest a spiral located
nearer to the deliberate pole. An inﬂuential factor on individual
differences that could be investigated further is cognitive style. For
example,Kreutz et al. (2008) propose thatmusicians processmusic
in two ways: as systemisers engaging with formal and mechanical
aspects of the music, and as empathisers demonstrating an interest
in understanding the emotional and affective aspects of music. A
musician with a stronger predilection for a certain cognitive style
or learning strategymaybeultimately directed away froma central,
balanced point in our model toward a more intuitive or deliberate
approach (for relevant psychological tests see Betsch, 2008; Betsch
and Iannello, 2010). Other individual differences for future study
could include age, gender, instrument,musical training, and social
and cultural background (Gaunt and Hallam, 2009).
A component of the model that could be investigated further is
differences between novice and expert decision-making in terms
of what we have termed type selection degree of chance. While
decisions are always subject to chance or mistakes, we have sug-
gested that experts have greater control (implicit or explicit) over
decision-making and select Type 1 or Type 2 decision-making
processes more appropriately or more intentionally to a greater
degree than novices. The issue of chance and control in type selec-
tion may be affected by several factors, such as the presence or
accessibility of resources (relevant knowledge and experience) or
mindware (learnt rules and procedures). Differences between per-
formers may also be partly due to metacognition, which has been
found to differ between expert and novice musicians (Hallam,
2001b; Jørgensen, 2004; Bathgate et al., 2012, p. 97–98). Future
research could explore how expert-novice differences in metacog-
nitive knowledge (of task requirements and personal resources)
and metacognitive control (self-regulation; Ertmer and Newby,
1996) inﬂuence the use of decision-making processes in musical
tasks.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined current understandings of Type 1 (intu-
itive) and Type 2 (deliberate) decision-making processes and
their application to studies of music performance. We described
a model intended to reﬁne existing theories of the interaction
between these processes and incorporate factors related to exper-
tise development. Our model uses an upward-spiraling motion
in the shape of a conical helix that proceeds across three dimen-
sions with two axes (x= proportion of decision-making processes,
y = level of expertise) and an ever-decreasing radius to demon-
strate consolidation and control over decision-making processes
with increasing expertise (see Figure 1). The model is based on
data from studies of musicians, but could be applied to other
domains. While the model incorporates elements of various theo-
ries and is supported by data outlined in the paper, further research
will be required to determine the level to which predictions using
the model can be veriﬁed and generalized.
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